Set Better Auth's native advanced.cookiePrefix to goto, preventing Goto from overwriting other apps' default authentication cookies when they share localhost.
HTTP cookie names use goto.*; HTTPS retains native __Secure-goto.* naming.
Sign-in, session reads, sign-out and OAuth state use the native configured namespace.
Existing cookie security attributes, session lifetime, CSRF/origin checks, providers and browser-client configuration are unchanged.
Existing Goto sessions require a fresh sign-in. Default/shared cookies are deliberately not deleted or migrated because they may belong to another app.
No new dependency, configuration knob, schema, cookie-name map or cleanup mechanism.
One commit, three files: one application setting, two focused in-process HTTP/HTTPS-configured auth cases, and fixed app-group patch metadata. The tests exercise the actual factory/handler and public cookie-parser pattern used by When; the app-specific prefix is an owner-selected adaptation, not an existing reference-app setting.
Verification
All four independent reviews are clean: readability, correctness/security, test quality and explicit reference parity.
pnpm verify passed:
Schema, workspace builds, TypeScript, Prettier and ESLint.
Svelte: 0 errors, 0 warnings.
528 workspace unit tests, including both new cookie-ownership cases.
6 script tests, 8 Chromium production-build E2E tests, 5 worker service process cases.
Changeset status and whitespace checks passed. All three committed blobs match the exact final reviewed/passing source hashes.
The new cases verify issued/logout cookie names and working session reads with foreign default cookies present. They use in-process Requests, not actual TLS sockets or a second app/browser cookie jar. Native deletion attributes and OAuth handling were source-reviewed, not duplicated into a library test matrix. Docker was not agent-run. Remote CI must pass before merge.
## Summary
Set Better Auth's native `advanced.cookiePrefix` to `goto`, preventing Goto from overwriting other apps' default authentication cookies when they share localhost.
- HTTP cookie names use `goto.*`; HTTPS retains native `__Secure-goto.*` naming.
- Sign-in, session reads, sign-out and OAuth state use the native configured namespace.
- Existing cookie security attributes, session lifetime, CSRF/origin checks, providers and browser-client configuration are unchanged.
- Existing Goto sessions require a fresh sign-in. Default/shared cookies are deliberately not deleted or migrated because they may belong to another app.
- No new dependency, configuration knob, schema, cookie-name map or cleanup mechanism.
One commit, three files: one application setting, two focused in-process HTTP/HTTPS-configured auth cases, and fixed app-group patch metadata. The tests exercise the actual factory/handler and public cookie-parser pattern used by When; the app-specific prefix is an owner-selected adaptation, not an existing reference-app setting.
## Verification
All four independent reviews are clean: readability, correctness/security, test quality and explicit reference parity.
`pnpm verify` passed:
- Schema, workspace builds, TypeScript, Prettier and ESLint.
- Svelte: **0 errors, 0 warnings**.
- **528 workspace unit tests**, including both new cookie-ownership cases.
- **6 script tests**, **8 Chromium production-build E2E tests**, **5 worker service process cases**.
Changeset status and whitespace checks passed. All three committed blobs match the exact final reviewed/passing source hashes.
The new cases verify issued/logout cookie names and working session reads with foreign default cookies present. They use in-process Requests, not actual TLS sockets or a second app/browser cookie jar. Native deletion attributes and OAuth handling were source-reviewed, not duplicated into a library test matrix. Docker was not agent-run. Remote CI must pass before merge.
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Summary
Set Better Auth's native
advanced.cookiePrefixtogoto, preventing Goto from overwriting other apps' default authentication cookies when they share localhost.goto.*; HTTPS retains native__Secure-goto.*naming.One commit, three files: one application setting, two focused in-process HTTP/HTTPS-configured auth cases, and fixed app-group patch metadata. The tests exercise the actual factory/handler and public cookie-parser pattern used by When; the app-specific prefix is an owner-selected adaptation, not an existing reference-app setting.
Verification
All four independent reviews are clean: readability, correctness/security, test quality and explicit reference parity.
pnpm verifypassed:Changeset status and whitespace checks passed. All three committed blobs match the exact final reviewed/passing source hashes.
The new cases verify issued/logout cookie names and working session reads with foreign default cookies present. They use in-process Requests, not actual TLS sockets or a second app/browser cookie jar. Native deletion attributes and OAuth handling were source-reviewed, not duplicated into a library test matrix. Docker was not agent-run. Remote CI must pass before merge.